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Assessing the risks of infrastructure investments has become a topic of growing importance. 
This is due to a sad record of implemented projects with cost overruns and demand shortfalls 
leading, in retrospect, to the finding that there is a need for better risk assessment of transport 
infrastructure investments. In the last decade progress has been made by dealing with this 
situation known as planners’ optimism bias. Especially attention can be drawn to the use of 
reference class forecasting that has led to adjustment factors that, when used on the estimates of 
costs and demand, lead to cost-benefit analysis results that are modified by taking historical risk 
experience into account. This article seeks to add to this progress in risk assessment methodology 
in two ways: first it suggests to apply reference class forecasting (RCF) in a flexible way where 
the effort is focused on formulating the best possible reference pool of projects and second to 
apply overconfidence theory (OT) to interpret expert judgments (EJ) about costs and demand as 
relating to a specific project up for examination. By combining flexible use of RCF with EJ based 
on OT interpretation it is argued that the current adjustment factor methodology of RCF can be 
further developed. The latter is among other things made possible by the comprehensive project 
databases that have been developed in recent years. For this article the project database 
developed in the UNITE research project 2009-2013 has been employed. The presented 
simulation-based risk examination named SIMRISK is concluded to provide a new ‘in-depth’ 
possibility for dealing with uncertainties inherent to transport decision making based on socio-
economic analysis. In addition a further research perspective is outlined.  
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1. Introduction 
Providing suitable decision support for strategic transport decision making is a topic of growing 
concern. This is due to a sad record of implemented projects with cost overruns and demand 
shortfalls leading, in retrospect, to the finding that there is a need for better risk assessment of 
transport infrastructure investments. In the last decade progress has been made dealing with this 
situation known as planners’ optimism bias (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Especially attention can be 
drawn to the use of reference class forecasting that has led to adjustment factors that, when used 
on the estimates of costs and demand, lead to cost-benefit analysis results that are modified by 
taking historical risk experience into account (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004). Research on 
infrastructure investment decisions in relation to the uncertainty in construction costs and 
transport prognoses – referred to as the transport demand estimates – has revealed that these 
factors are especially critical in the cost-benefit analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Thus Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2003) have disclosed a consistent tendency towards overestimating transport-related benefits 
and underestimating construction costs which shows the presence of estimation problems in the 
assessments. Many cases have been documented where a poorly executed estimation of both 
impacts has led to investments that later on turned out to be less than satisfactory (Priemus et al., 
2008; Cantarelli et al., 2012a, 2012b; Nicolaisen, 2012). Therefore it becomes of great relevance to 
examine the construction costs and transport demand estimates found to be the major sources of 
uncertainty in order to minimize the risk of selecting inadequate projects. This is especially 
relevant for large infrastructure projects (Banister and Berechman, 2000). 
In addition to current methodology based on reference class forecasting (e.g. Flyvbjerg and 
COWI, 2004) this article presents a new approach that makes flexible use of reference class 
forecasting (RCF) and expert judgments (EJ) in combination. After a presentation of RCF and EJ 
in Sections 2 and 3, respectively, and their combination in Section 4, a case study in Section 5 
demonstrates the principles on a major transport investment. Section 6 is a discussion of the 
suggested new approach, among other things with a comparison with the currently recognised 
approach based on reference class forecasting which makes use of uplift factors. Section 7 
presents a conclusion and perspective. The research behind the article was carried out in the 
UNITE project (2009-2013) about uncertainties in transport project evaluation funded by the 
Danish Strategic Research Council.  
2. Reference Class Forecasting 
2.1 Optimism Bias and Uplift factors 
Reference class forecasting (RCF) is based on theories of judgment under uncertainty deriving 
from the Nobel Prize winning work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman, 2011). 
The main idea behind RCF is that a suitable set of projects similar in type to the project examined 
can serve as a reference in terms of their individually experienced uncertainty to inform the 
actual examination of uncertainty. Reference class forecasting has been used and operationalized 
by Flyvbjerg and others to set out various adjustment or ‘uplift’ principles (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 
2004; Priemus et al., 2008). These principles are applied to modify given estimates by uplift 
factors based on a project database sample collected over the past decades depicting, in this case, 
costs and demands for transport infrastructure projects, respectively. The RCF project database 
contains information on each project as indicated in (1): 
  
((     )    )
  
                (1) 
where U is percent inaccuracy, Xa is the actual traffic demand/cost after the project is opened and 
Xf is the forecasted traffic demand/cost on which the decision to build has been taken. 
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To exemplify the mentioned uplift principles for costs, Table 1 shows some of the uplifts 
applicable within transport infrastructure projects that planners can use to take different levels of 
optimism bias into account in the appraisal. Altogether five different levels (the levels of certainty 
aimed at) are indicated ranging from 50 to 90% across three main categories of transport 
infrastructure projects: road, rail and fixed link. Each of these categories includes a huge variety 
of different project types, i.e. road comprises motorways, trunk roads, local roads, bus lane 
schemes etc., while rail comprises metro projects, light rail projects, high speed rail projects etc., 
and fixed link bridges and tunnels (Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004). 
Table 1. Applicable investment cost uplifts for selected percentiles applied to constant 
prices (adapted from Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004) 
Level of acceptable 
optimism bias 
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Road 15% 24% 27% 32% 45% 
Rail (and air) 40% 45% 51% 57% 68% 
Fixed Link 23% 26% 34% 55% 83% 
 
The certainty levels are classified according to the risk aversion of decision-makers in terms of 
cost overruns. In case the risk of a cost overrun must be for instance less than 20% (certainty level 
80%) for a road type project, the construction cost estimate must be uplifted by 32%. Thereby an 
initial budget estimate equal to 100 million DKK is raised to 132 million DKK to ensure with 80% 
probability that the final investment cost will not surpass 132 million DKK. Flyvbjerg and COWI 
(2004) have suggested to apply the 50 percentile (low certainty) for decision-makers who are 
willing to take a high risk that cost overruns can occur, while 80% can be applied by investors 
demanding a higher degree of certainty that cost overruns will not occur. This will typically be 
the case when no additional funds are available. 
Table 1 can guide practitioners and analysts within the field of transport project appraisal. 
However, as RCF assumes a known outcome distribution, it is a requirement that the examined 
project is likely to display similar properties to that of the projects in the reference class. 
Practitioners should thus consider how comparable the projects in the reference class are to the 
project being examined. 
Similarly to cost overruns, adjustments can also be estimated for demand shortfalls. Instead of 
using overall RCF uplift factors that modify initial and optimistic values (adjusting too low 
construction costs and too high demand forecasts) it is in this context suggested to apply the 
historical information and experience in the reference class of projects as a base for derivation of 
probability distributions that can enter into e.g. a Monte Carlo simulation of costs and demand 
estimates, see Salling and Leleur (2009; 2011). The principles are given below with a description 
of the concept of certainty graphs. 
2.2 The concept of certainty graphs 
Basically the point estimate result benefit-cost ratio (BCR) from the cost-benefit analysis is 
replaced by a probability-based interval result referred to as the certainty graph. This graph is 
formulated through input probability distributions associated with the construction costs and 
transport demand, respectively – transport demand as expected benefits from future travelling 
time savings and revenue – to be entered into the Monte Carlo simulation (Vose, 2008; Salling, 
2008). Specifically, the certainty graph (CG) is made up of the accumulated probability estimates 
for achieving at least the BCR indicated as argument; thus:  CG(x) = P(BCR ≥ x). An example is 
shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. The concept of a certainty graph 
 
The cost-benefit analysis applied should be based on a procedure or protocol (the actual national 
CBA-manual for example) that can generally be accepted in the study context. For a large 
transport infrastructure investment the impacts to be covered will generally consist of: 
construction and maintenance costs, time savings, operation costs, accidents, noise emissions, 
local air pollution and climate (Trafikministeriet, 2003; European Commission, 2008). 
The validity of the CG depends on the probability distributions used for the construction costs 
and the transport demand. Salling (2008) has shown that the Erlang (Gamma) and Beta-PERT 
distributions are plausible probability distribution functions for construction costs and transport 
demand, the main sources of uncertainty in transport infrastructure appraisal. In the below 
demo-case in Section 5 the Erlang distribution is used for the construction costs, while a 
histogram distribution is used for the transport demand. The formulation of this histogram 
distribution making use of reference class forecasting and scenario-based expert judgments in 
combination is the main focus of the demo-case.  
3. Expert judgments 
Each feasibility study of a proposed large transport infrastructure project is carried out by a team 
comprising a number of experts with different areas of professional knowledge. As regards the 
experts to be consulted as part of the risk assessment, especially the design engineers and the 
planners doing the forecasts are of interest. These experts are usually willing to be involved in the 
interviews which are undertaken to lead to expert judgments about Min and Max estimates of the 
costs of the infrastructure and the expected demand with the latter represented by values such as 
number of vehicles and number of passengers in the target year of the prognosis. 
These expert judgments can, as mentioned, be made by interviewing key persons that have been 
involved in the project planning. However, it may also be considered to use workshops where 
scenarios are made use of as described below. 
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Certainty graph example indicates 83% certainty that the investment 
is feasible, i.e. BCR is greater than or equal to 1 
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3.1 Making use of scenarios 
The way scenarios can be employed is described in relation to the Nuuk airport case, which is 
applied in Section 5 for a practical demonstration of the principles and methodology set out in 
this article. Below, focus has been limited to the scenarios that relate to the variability of demand, 
i.e. the Min and Max estimates to enter into the risk assessment. 
In the Nuuk airport case, scenarios were formulated in a context of two major axes representing 
what was perceived as the two most influential drivers of uncertainty. Afterwards, each driver 
was subdivided into three categories, which thus expressed a suitable scenario-grid for the 
deliberations about how the demand for air travel to and from Nuuk would be influenced by the 
different future developments indicated by the scenarios. In this way the scenario-grid in Figure 
2 was set up (Salling and Leleur, 2011). 
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Figure 2. The concept of scenario-grid 
 
The purpose of a scenario-grid is to assist the experts in making Min and Max estimates with 
each scenario as a plausible background. It is important to note that only Min and Max estimates 
are needed, and furthermore that the specific scenario producing the Min estimate can be 
expected to be different from the scenario producing the Max value. Therefore the estimates are 
global and not tied as pairs to one of the scenarios. 
With several experts involved, the expert judgment to be part of the risk assessment is simply 
obtained by making use of average values from the experts or by setting these as agreed 
‘consensus’ values. This provides what in the risk assessment can be seen as contextual 
information representing an ‘Inside view’ opposite to the ‘Outside view’ of reference class 
forecasting (RCF) (Kahneman, 2011, chapter 23). The next stage is to bring this together with the 
‘deviation-record’ of similar projects implemented in the past. This is the RCF-component of the 
risk examination, which is dependent on which projects are used as references. For this purpose 
an established large project database must be made use of and adapted to the actual transport 
infrastructure project up for examination. Adapted here refers to the situation in which a number 
of previously implemented projects can be identified as being so similar to the actual one that 
they can be used to form a subgroup of projects in the project database providing historical 
experience that can be used to express possible future variability as regards the actual project 
under examination. 
3.2 The adapted project database 
As mentioned an established reference class of similar projects is part of the platform for the risk 
examination, where each project in the project database, established as part of the background for 
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working with RCF-information, is judged on the basis of its relevance as useful historical 
experience. This provides the subset of reference projects, which is referred to as the adapted 
project database, see the bottom of Figure 3 that gives an overview of the methodology applied in 
the model software (Salling and Leleur, 2015). 
The UNITE-DSS Decision Support Model
Deterministic Calculation
1) Cost-benefit analysis
Results: Point estimates in 
terms of NPV, BCR, IRR
2) Optimism Bias Uplifts
Reference class forecasting 
based on uplift factors
Stochastic Calculation
3) RCF: Reference Class Forecasting
Determination of distributions 
from database
Outside view
Results: Certainty graphs and certainty valuesResults: Point estimates in 
terms of NPV, BCR, IRR
Selection of distribution(s) for 
Monte Carlo simulation
Expert judgments about Min 
and Max values
Outside & Inside view
Scaling of RCF-histogram 
distribution
The UNITE Project Database
Inaccuracy in Construction Cost Estimates Inaccuracy in Demand Forecasts
Year of Acceptance Year of Operation
Initial Cost Actual Cost Initial Demand Actual Traffic
Year of Acceptance Year of Operation
Adapted project database: Subset of relevant projects applicable as 
historical experience for the project being examined
Currency & Price 
level
Traffic Model 
used
Project Name Type & ID U (difference): Before vs. After 
Selection of level of 
acceptable optimism bias
Adjusted impact(s) to cost-
benefit analysis
Impact assessment: Travel 
time savings, etc.
Unit Prices: Value of time, 
etc.
Investment costs and 
discounting
 
Figure 3. Overview of the UNITE-DSS software 
 
As indicated in Figure 3 the UNITE-DSS software comprises both deterministic calculation 
(including cost-benefit analysis and optimism bias uplifts) and stochastic calculation comprising 
both a version taking an Outside view and a version taking an Outside & Inside view. As noted 
above the term ‘outside’ stems from Kahneman and indicates the main idea of RCF to make use 
of solely ‘outside’ reference projects for dealing with the project inaccuracy to be examined 
(Kahneman, 2011, chapter 23). The idea proposed in this article to make use of reference class 
forecasting in combination with expert judgments, with the latter representing the inside view of 
experts, has inspired the authors’ use of the denomination Outside & Inside view. 
The adapted project database at the bottom of Figure 3 is presented in more detail in Figure 4. 
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The UNITE Project Database
Specific information break-down with regard to the type and economic situation (additionally)
Type (mode and construction)
Road Rail Fixed link
Motorway construction 
(MWC)
Motorway upgrade 
(MWU)
Highway construction 
(HWC)
Bypass construction 
(BPC)
Tunnel construction 
(TUC)
Grade separation 
construction (GSC)
High speed rail 
construction (HSRC)
Other interurban rail 
construction (OIRC)
Urban and metro rail 
construction (UMRC)
Bridge construction (BC)
Tunnel construction 
(TC)
Bridge and tunnel 
construction (BTC)
Size
S2
(250 - 1000 m DKK)
S3
(1000 m - DKK)
Economic situation
Category E1 
(Low economic growth)
Category E2
(Medium economic growth)
Category E3
(High economic growth)
S1
( - 250 m DKK)
Actual cost Economic parameters and comments
 
Figure 4. Information break-down within the UNITE Project Database with regard to type of 
infrastructure project 
 
Figure 4 depicts the structure and content of the current UNITE Project Database containing 
information with regard to road, rail and fixed link projects, respectively. Previous research 
carried out in the field (from e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Priemus et al., 2008) focussed on the 
difference between the initial cost and demand and the actual cost and demand, respectively, 
thereby providing for each project a value for U as presented in (1). In addition to such a focus, 
the UNITE research work has given priority also to broadening the information about the 
projects in the database so each project in the database has a direct link to an Access Database 
with detailed and comprehensive information about the project, including also relevant 
references and source details. This helps to investigate and ensure the verification and validity of 
data from the UNITE Project Database and will provide an important basis for further research. 
For example, it can be investigated what influence the actual economic growth regime has on the 
RCF-data. 
As the adapted project database with its RCF-information plays a major role in the proposed 
methodology, so do the previously described experts judgments. How these respective inside 
and outside views can be combined is described below. 
4. Combining RCF with Expert Judgments 
The ‘inside’ uncertainty that is disclosed by the Min and Max values is used to ‘calibrate’ the 
‘outside’ historical uncertainty revealed by the set of deviations from the adapted project 
database by using overconfidence theory, see (Van de Venter and Michayluk, 2008; Taleb, 2010). 
This theory states that people in general (including experts) are unaware of their lack of 
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capability to indicate a complete range of variation. This means that the ranges indicated by the 
experts’ Min and Max estimates for costs and demand are too narrow. On the basis of 
examinations carried out in many different contexts, it has been found that the ranges provided 
by the people that have been questioned typically only account for around 60% of the variation (i.e. 
they are overconfident about their ability to indicate a full interval for the variability). This result 
is relatively stable (Van de Venter and Michayluk, 2008, p. 549; Goodwin & Wright, 2009, p. 251), 
which is what makes it relevant to be used in the proposed risk assessment approach referred to 
as SIMRISK (simulation-based risk assessment). In SIMRISK overconfidence theory is used to 
modify (extend or contract) the histogram distribution of deviations determined from the 
adapted project database. 
By taking the Min and Max values as representative of the 20% and 80% percentiles (thereby 
defining the central 60% ‘overconfidence interval’) a histogram distribution of deviations based 
on the adapted project database can be transformed by rescaling it to fit this central interval. 
Thereby a case-specific histogram probability distribution is produced, which can be used as 
input for the Monte Carlo simulation by applying e.g. the @RISK software (Palisade Corporation, 
2007) to produce a case-specific certainty graph, see Subsection 2.2 above. We refer to this 
distribution as the SIMRISK probability distribution function (pdf). The characteristic of this 
distribution is that it represents a mix of historical RCF-information and expert derived project-
specific information combined by using overconfidence theory. A SIMRISK pdf can be worked 
out for both the construction costs and for the transport demand. In the case example below the 
SIMRISK methodology is demonstrated solely on transport demand uncertainty (prognosis for 
future traffic load), whereas the uncertainty of construction costs is modelled on the basis of an 
Erlang distribution, see (Salling and Leleur, 2009). However, with construction costs also being 
treated as scenario-sensitive the SIMRISK methodology can include also construction costs in the 
uncertainty examination similar to the way that transport demand is described to be included. In 
the simulation it is assumed that construction costs and transport demand are uncorrelated 
(Salling, 2008). 
5. Nuuk Airport as demo-case 
The case demonstration makes use of information described in (Leleur et al., 2007; Salling and 
Banister, 2009; Salling and Leleur, 2011), in which an examination of the international airport in 
Nuuk is presented by three case alternatives. These consist of two upgrade alternatives replacing 
the existing runway in Nuuk, i.e. increasing the current runway length to either 1799 metres (m) 
or 2200m, and as the third alternative the construction of a new, relocated airport to the south 
with a 3000m runway, consequently leading to the closing of the existing airport. Results from 
this study clearly pointed towards either of the two extension alternatives leaving the Nuuk 
3000m alternative infeasible from a societal perspective (Leleur et al., 2007). In October 2007 
information was released that the Home Rule Authorities in Greenland recommended the Nuuk 
2200m alternative for implementation (Sermitsiaq.AG, 2007). However, construction work has 
not been started yet. In the light hereof this article examines the socio-economic robustness of this 
decision by applying reference class forecasting and combining an outside view (RCF-data) with 
an inside view based on expert judgments. 
The UNITE Project Database currently consists of 262 projects of which altogether 204 projects 
were judged as not being relevant for the Nuuk airport case. The selection process as described 
above is simply a click on/click off procedure in the UNITE-DSS software developed in the 
UNITE project. In this way the remaining 58 projects were identified as a representative, relevant 
historical reference when considering the uncertainty that could be expected to influence the 
transport demand (representing the forecast of benefits from saved travel time and revenue). 
Together they define the histogram pdf below in Figure 5. The inaccuracy is based on the 
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percentage deviation U of the actual value Xa from the forecasted value as indicated in (1) above. 
For transport demand the green colour indicates a ‘favourable’ deviation (higher than forecasted) 
and the red colour a ‘critical’ deviation (lower than forecasted) with regard to the influence on the 
socio-economic feasibility of the examined alternative. The range between -20% and 20% is 
considered an acceptable practical deviation and is not colourised. Favourable and critical 
deviations thus highlight the influence on the BCR-value and have been indicated to ease the 
reading of the histograms. 
 
Figure 5. Histogram pdf based on RCF information for the Nuuk airport case 
 
At an expert conference consisting of a small group of people with a special and detailed 
knowledge about the Nuuk project, the model estimate 170 (rounded overall benefit measure 
from monetary value) was presented, and the participants were informed about the underlying 
premises and the traffic demand modelling work behind this estimate. Furthermore, the major 
sources of uncertainty were explained to the participants. The background and the possible 
influence from the two drivers behind the rising uncertainty in Figure 2 were included in this 
presentation and discussion. Each participant was then asked to give a global Max and Min 
estimate and, thereby, an interval was determined that the expert was confident would include 
the value that was expected to be realised in the future by implementing the project.  
By averaging the individual responses, the Max estimate 230 ((230-170)/170 = +35%) and the Min 
estimate 90 ((90-170)/170 = -47%) were obtained. Thus the participants seen as a group were 
confident that the value to be realized was somewhere in the interval from 90 to 230. Using the 
%-deviation from the model estimate 170 as a yardstick we find that the length of this interval is 
35% - (-47%) = 82%. Using Figure 5 and surveying the probability mass between 35% and -47% 
and beyond we can note that the experts ‘miss’ some historically referenced variability. Their 
actual overconfidence can, however, be set against the expected overconfidence, which can be 
done in the following way. Using  the adapted project database as shown in Figure 5, the 
intersections of the 20% and 80% percentiles (that distribute the probability mass in 20% LOW, 
60% CENTRAL INTERVAL and 20% HIGH) can be identified and applied to determine the 
distance between these intersection points (again we use as the yardstick the %-deviation from 
the model estimate 170). This length of the central interval is found to be 70%. Thereby we can see 
that the full interval (in the experts’ overconfident opinion) of variability is ‘wider’ (82%) than the 
central interval (70%) based on applying the RCF-data. The expert interval could also have been 
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‘narrower’ than the central interval with a distance of maybe 65%. In either situation, however, it 
is important to keep in mind that the group of experts is ‘overconfident’ about its ability to 
capture the overall variability of the value. 
By applying the result from the overconfidence theory as presented in (Van de Venter and 
Michayluk, 2008) that the group’s ‘overconfidence’ is 60%, the x-axis in Figure 5 is adjusted with 
a factor equal to: 82%/70% = 1.17. By use of this factor, we transform the histogram in Figure 5 
into the histogram in Figure 6 as shown below. Hereby, the probability mass in Figure 5 is 
‘stretched’ by multiplying each project’s percentage deviation U, see (1) above; the width of the 
histogram bins is kept equal to 20%. 
 
Figure 6. SIMRISK pdf based on scaling the RCF-histogram for the Nuuk airport case 
 
Thus, Figure 6 shows the resulting SIMRISK histogram or pdf when the RCF-information is 
modified by using the expert judgments and making use of overconfidence theory to calibrate 
their interplay. As the scaling factor is higher than 1, the input from the experts ‘adds’ to the 
uncertainty provided by the historical information in the adapted project database. The opposite 
will be the case with a scaling factor less than 1, which will produce a narrower and steeper 
histogram distribution instead of a wider and flatter distribution. 
By using the SIMRISK pdf from Figure 6 as input to a Monte Carlo simulation as regards traffic 
demand together with an Erlang pdf for construction costs, the certainty graph in Figure 7 is 
obtained. 
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Figure 7. SIMRISK certainty graph result for the Nuuk airport case 
 
It can be seen that compared to the BCR point estimate equal to 2.52 (Salling and Leleur, 2011), 
the certainty graph expresses that there is only 16% probability to achieve such a BCR. In general, 
there is a 78% probability that the investment is feasible from a socio-economic point of view, i.e. 
that the BCR is greater than or equal to 1. 
6. Discussion 
The robustness analysis of the Nuuk airport case shows that the result from a conventional cost-
benefit analysis providing a BCR equal to 2.52 is to be seen as rather optimistic. With the BCR 
cut-off value equal to 1, the case result is that with rounded values the Nuuk 2200m alternative 
has around 80% probability of being a socio-economically feasible transport infrastructure 
investment. This finding is seen as highly relevant for the decision-makers. Furthermore, they 
will also note that the BCR equal to 2.52 (or higher) is only expected with around 15% certainty 
according to the determined certainty graph.  
Evidently, the result obtained is dependent on the subset of projects selected from the project 
database. In the Nuuk case 58 projects were selected as relevant out of 262 projects. In this 
selection process it was necessary to scrutinise each project to decide whether it should be 
included or not. Based on the UNITE Project Database it became possible to obtain a reasonable 
number of projects in the subset while maintaining the focus on the relevance of each project 
selected for the actual examination. In the Nuuk-case especially similarity as regards size of 
investment and type of construction were seen as decisive selection parameters. 
Generally the identification of the adapted database and the number of projects included are 
important activities that will influence the uncertainty examination. It is also evident that the 
expert judgments influence the outcome of the examination. Therefore, the appointment of 
experts and the conduct of their involvement are important issues. To establish a foundation as 
concerns the validity of the examination result, it is recommended that a log book is worked out 
as part of the examination. In this way the result can afterwards be reconsidered by inspecting 
the arguments behind the establishment of the adapted project database and the expert 
judgments behind the Min and Max estimates. 
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As concerns the validity of the results provided by the SIMRISK certainty graph it can be noted 
that in the case above the experts’ input added to the uncertainty provided by the RCF-
information. This is simply due to the fact that a scaling factor higher than 1 (in this case 1.17) 
was found based on applying overconfidence theory. In case a scaling factor below 1 had been 
found leading to a contraction of the RCF-histogram it could – instead of basing the SIMRISK 
certainty graph on this – have been considered to keep the RCF-histogram unscaled. With such a 
more cautious use of the methodology it produces a result that is in principle not different from a 
result based on the earlier mentioned RCF-uplift factors if these are updated based on the 
adapted project database. However, compared to the deterministic uplift factor approach the 
stochastic RCF-Outside & Inside view approach set out in this article may have the advantage of 
communicating the uncertainty of the investment in a graphical way that is easier for the decision 
makers to understand and make use of. The proposed cautious use of the SIMRISK methodology 
may have the advantage that the level of uncertainty due to RCF-information can be tested so 
that with scaling factors below 1 the RCF-information is kept unchanged while with scaling 
factors higher than 1 SIMRISK makes it possible to include and examine certain special 
circumstances from expert judgment indicating that the uncertainty may well be higher than if solely 
RCF-information is made use of. This possibility to pick up such special uncertainty is found to be a 
highly interesting feature as in some respects all large infrastructure projects are unique when 
being inspected closely. As concerns ease of use it should be noted that with the subset of projects 
determined in the UNITE Project Database and with the experts’ Min and Max estimates laid 
down, the UNITE-DSS software promptly produces the RCF-histogram, the scaling factor, the 
SIMRISK pdf and the resulting SIMRISK certainty graph, see Figures 5-7. Furthermore, the 
software includes the possibility to change the overconfidence value from the default value 60% 
to a higher or lower value in case certain conditions indicate that this is relevant, see Lin and Bier 
(2008). 
7. Conclusion and Perspective 
A new approach based on the combination of reference class forecasting and expert judgments 
has been outlined for the purpose of undertaking simulation-based risk examination, SIMRISK, 
with regard to the socio-economic feasibility influenced by optimism bias. This is a topic that in 
recent years has been examined by several researchers based on the use of reference class 
forecasting, which, among other things, has led to a methodology applying uplift factors. No 
doubt this was an improvement compared to a conventional sensitivity analysis. This article 
proposes to combine historical RCF-experience based on a selected set of relevant projects in 
combination with expert judgments from a conducted expert conference. 
A central assumption is that historical RCF-information can be combined with expert judgments 
and that overconfidence theory can be made use of in this respect. The principles have been 
demonstrated by using SIMRISK on the Nuuk airport case. As described the expert judgments 
can both add to the uncertainty revealed by the RCF-information but also deduct from this 
uncertainty which will depend on the scaling factor found. With a scaling factor equal to 1 no 
change will occur. A cautious way of using SIMRISK has been pointed out by suggesting that 
modification of the RCF-histogram is only carried out for scaling factors higher than 1, i.e. for 
situations where the inputs from the experts imply a possibly higher uncertainty than revealed 
by the RCF-information. Decision makers may perceive a risk assessment tool to detect such 
situations as very useful. 
Naturally, the usefulness of the methodology outlined in this article to a great extent depends on 
the quality of the database in establishing suitable reference classes. This can be a major obstacle, 
as detailed data collection and archiving procedures for completed projects are rarely standard 
practice. However, the increasing focus on inaccurate forecasts has led to some improvements in 
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this area, and several countries now have mandatory auditing of certain transport infrastructure 
schemes that, in time, will allow for a greatly improved empirical foundation for the 
methodology outlined in this article. 
Based on the work so far it can be concluded that the procedure followed in the developed 
uncertainty examination can be comprehended by the decision-makers. It can be noted that 
certainty graphs, when introduced in the right way, are found to communicate the uncertainty of 
the assessment in a proper and understandable way. Upcoming research will focus on 
establishing a larger empirical project database including a guidance on how to use it in the best 
and most flexible way. Guidelines for the interaction with experts will also be an important 
research task. 
Overall we conclude that the presented SIMRISK approach based on combining reference class 
forecasting with overconfidence theory provides a new ‘in-depth’ possibility for dealing with the 
uncertainties inherent to transport infrastructure decision making based on socio-economic 
analysis. As especially large transport infrastructure projects are unique, the Outside & Inside 
view adapted in SIMRISK, see Figure 3, makes it possible to add to the way of risk examination 
based solely on reference class forecasting (the Outside view) with expert judgment (the Inside 
view). The potential of this novel approach, to our knowledge not dealt with so far in the 
reference class forecasting literature, will be further examined in new case studies supported by 
the developed UNITE-DSS software and the established UNITE Project Database, with the latter 
to be successively enlarged by adding new projects. 
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